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INREJADD
I. INTRODUCTION

In February of 1984, in In re Jadd,) the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts concluded that a residency requirement for attorneys
seeking admission to the Massachusetts bar on motion violates the
United States Constitution. 2 Accordingly, the court struck down its
rule 3 requiring applicants for admission to the bar on motion to have
1. 391 Mass. 227, 461 N.E.2d 760 (1984).
2. Id. at 228, 461 N.E.2d at 761. If the court grants the motion, the Commonwealth
admits the attorney to the bar. The attorney, therefore, does not have to pass an examina
tion. Id. at 227 n.l, 461 N.E.2nd at 761 n.1.
3. Sup. Jud. Ct. R. 3:01 § 6.1.1, as amended, 382 Mass. 698, 755-56 (1981), embod
ied the requirement.
Section 6. Admission Without Examination.
6.1 Attorneys Admitted in Other States. A person who has been admitted
as an attorney of the highest judicial court of any State, district or territory of the
United States may apply to the Supreme Judicial Court for admission, without
examination, as an attorney in this Commonwealth. The Board of Bar Examina
tions may, in its discretion, excuse the applicant from taking the regular law ex
amination on the applicant's compliance with the following conditions:
6.1.1 The applicant's principal residence is in the Commonwealth of Mas
sachusetts.
6.1.2 The applicant shall have been admitted in the other State, district or
territory, for at least five years prior to applying for admission in the Common
wealth, and shall provide the court with a certificate of admission from the high
est judicial court of such State, district or territory.
6.1.3 The applicant shall have so engaged in the practice or teaching oflaw
since the prior admission as to satisfy the Board of Bar Examiners of his or her
good moral character and professional qualifications.
6.1.4 The applicant shall submit to the Board of Bar Examiners letters of
recommendation for admission from three members of the bar of the Common
wealth, or of the State, district or territory of prior admission, or of the bar of the
State, district or territory in which the applicant has last resided.
6.1.5 The applicant shall have graduated from high school, or shall have
received the equivalent education, in the opinion of the Board, completed work
for a :bachelor's degree at a college or university, or its equivalent, and graduated
from a law school which at the time of graduation, was approved by the Ameri
can Bar Association.
Following its decision in In Re Jadd, the supreme judicial court amended the rules. The
amended rules require applicants to pass the Multi-state Professional Responsibility Exam
ination and a limited written examination on Massachusetts practice. Sup. Jud. Ct. R. 3:01
§§ 6.1.1-6.1.6, reprinted in 12 MASS. LAW. WEEK. 1541 (1984) (effective January 1, 1985).
The rules now provide:
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their principal residences in the Commonwealth. 4
Robert I. Jadd, a resident of New York and a member of the
Florida and New York bars, challenged the former rule. s He sought
admission on motion but the Board of Bar Examiners denied his appli
cation because he was not a Massachusetts resident. 6
Jadd argued that the residency requirement violated the privileges
and immunities clause of Article IV of the United States Constitu
tion. 7 The court agreed, basing its decision on two factors. First, it
6.1.1 The applicant shall have been admitted in the other state, district or
territory, for at least five years prior to applying for admission in the Common
wealth, and shall provide the court with certificate of admission from the highest
judicial court of such state, district or territory.
6.1.2 The applicant shall have so engaged in the practice or teaching of law
since the prior admission as to satisfy the Board of Bar Examiners of his or her
good moral character and professional qualifications.
6.1.3 The applicant shall submit to the board of Examiners letters of rec
ommendation for admission from three members of the bar of the Common
wealth, or of the state, district or territory of prior admission, or the bar of the
state, district or territory in which the applicant last resided.
6.1.4 The applicant shall have graduated from high school, or shall have
received the equivalent education, in the opinion of the Board, completed work
for a bachelor's degree at a college or university, or its equivalent, and graduated
from a law school which at the time of graduation was approved by the American
Bar Association.
6.1.5 The applicant shall pass the Multi-state Professional Responsibility
Examination if he or she has not previously passed that examination in another
jurisdiction.
6.1.6 The applicant shall pass a limited written examination in Massachu
setts practice and procedure which shall be administered by the Board of Bar
Examiners.

Id.
Justices Wilkins and O'Connor dissented from the adoption of the amendment, voic
ing concern about the restrictiveness of the rules. Id.
The supreme judicial court is vested with authority to make and promulgate rules in
order to regulate the practice of law in the Massachusetts judicial system. See MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 213, § 3 (West 1958); Raymond, Massachusetts State Court Organization
Profile, 1979 A.B.A. PUB. at 13.
4. In re Jadd, 391 Mass. at 237 n.13, 461 N.E.2d at 766 n.13. For amended rule, see
supra note 2.
5. Id. at 227, 461 N.E.2d at 760-61.
6. Id. at 228, 461 N.E.2d at 761. The Board of Bar Examiners did not advise the
court whether Jadd met the other requirements of Rule 3:01 section 6. Id. at 228 n.3, 461
N.E.2d at 761 n.3. See supra note 2. Jadd had only petitioned for a hearing before a single
justice (Abrams) of the supreme judicial court. Justice Abrams, however, reported the
matter to the court for decision. Id. at 228, 461 N.E.2d at 761.
7. Id. at 226, 461 N.E.2d at 761. The court expressed confidence that Jadd's rights
"probably would be no greater under the commerce clause," so it did not discuss that issue.
Id. at 228 n.2, 461 N.E.2d at 761 n.2. In Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978), the
Supreme Court stated that a "mutually reinforcing relationship [exists] between the Privi
leges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2, and the Commerce Clause." Id. at 531. The
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reasoned that the practice of law constituted a fundamental right for
purposes of an analysis under the privileges and immunities clause. 8
Second, it found that a sufficient state interest for requiring residency
for admission to the bar did not exist. 9 The court noted that many
state courts had determined that their own residency requirements
were unconstitutional. \0 From its analysis of these factors, the court
eliminated the residency rule. I I The court also concluded that it was
unnecessary to determine whether an attorney admitted on motion
was required to take a state bar examination as well as fulfill a resi
dency requirement. 12

II.

ANALYSIS

In addressing the plaintiff's claim that the rule violated the Con
stitution, the court in In Re Jadd focused on the privileges and immu
nities clause of Article IV which states, "[t]he Citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States."13 The court followed the two-step analysis developed
relationship "sterns from their common origin in the Fourth Article of the Articles of Con
federation and their shared vision of federalism." Id. at 531-32 (footnote omitted). The
Fourth Article of the Articles of Confederation afforded persons of different states the same
privileges of trade and commerce. Hence, Jadd could have argued that the commerce
clause under Hicklin requires persons from jurisdictions outside Massachusetts to be af
forded the same privileges as those held by citizens of Massachusetts regarding admission
to the Massachusetts bar.
8. In re Jadd, 391 Mass. at 228-29, 461 N.E.2d at 761.
9. Id. at 234-36, 461 N.E.2d at 763-65.
10. In re Jadd, 391 Mass. at 230-33, 236, 461 N.E.2d at 762-64. See, e.g., Piper v.
Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 539 F. Supp. 1064 (D.N.H. 1982), rev'd, 723 F.2d 98,
withdrawn, affd. on reh'g., 723 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1983), prob. juris. noted, 104 S. Ct. 2149
(1984); Stalland v. South Dakota Bd. of Bar Examiners, 530 F.Supp. 155, 158 (D.S.D.
1982); Strauss v. Alabama State Bar, 520 F.Supp. 173 (N.D. Ala. 1981); Sargus v. West
Virginia Bd. of Law Examiners, 294 S.E.2d 440 (W. Va. 1982); Sheley v. Alaska Bar Ass'n,
620 P.2d 640 (Alaska 1980); In re Gordon, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 399 N.E.2d 1309,422 N.Y.S.2d
641 (1979).
11. In re Jadd, 391 Mass. at 237 & n.13, 461 N.E.2d at 766 & n.13. For amended
rule see supra note 2.
12. Id. at 236-37, 461 N.E.2d at 765-66.
13. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. The privileges and immunities clause analyzed in
In Re Jadd should not be confused with the privileges and immunities clause of the four
teenth amendment which pertains to those rights protected under national citizenship. Ar
ticle IV, section 2, clause 1, provides protection to citizens in states in which they do not
reside. Professor Tribe refers to this provision as the "interstate privileges and immunities
clause." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-32, at 404 (1978). See Note,
Constitutional Law-The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV: Fundamental
Rights Revived-Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission, 436 U.S. 371 (1978), 55 WASH. L.
REV. 461, 463 n.19 (1980). Although the language of the privileges and immunities clause
only mentions citizens, for the purposes of analysis" 'citizen' and 'resident' are 'essentially
interchangeable,' " Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 n.8 (1978) (quoting Austin v. New
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by the Supreme Court.14 First, the court must find that the privileges
and immunities clause is protecting a fundamental right denied to
non-residents. 15 Second, the court must decide that "the state has a
sufficient interest in requiring residency so as to justify the discrimina
tion."16 If a fundamental right is jeopardized, and the state has a sub
stantial reason for the discrimination, then the Constitution allows the
requirement. 17
The court in In Re Jadd determined that the practice of law is a
fundamental right since it constitutes "an important commercial act iv
ity."18 The court based its assessment on conclusions of the United
States Supreme Court and courts of other jurisdictions. 19 A careful
examination of Supreme Court interpretations of the privileges and
immunities clause reveals that a person's right to practice a trade is a
fundamental right. 20 In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,21 the Supreme
Court recognized that the legal profession may be equated with the
Hampshire, 437 U.S. 656, 662 n.8 (1975». See also Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 397
(1948).
14. See Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n of Mont., 436 U.S. 371, 383-84, 388
(1978). The Baldwin court held that neither the privileges and immunities clause of art. IV
section 2, nor the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment protect a non-resident's
right to recreational big-game hunting in Montana. Id. at 388, 391. See Note, supra note
13, at 463.
15. Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 383-384 (1978); see Austin v.
New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 660-61 (1975); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall) 418,
430 (1870).
16. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395-96 (1948).
17. Id. at 396.
18. In re Jadd, 391 Mass. at 230, 461 N.E.2d at 762.
19. Although the United States Supreme Court has not explicitly stated that the
practice of law is a fundamental right, an inference that it is can be drawn from the Court's
analysis in various cases. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 368-72 (1977);
Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 788 (1975); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 723
24 (1973). See Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 539 F.Supp. 1064, 1071
(D.N.H. 1982), rev'd., 723 F.2d 98, withdrawn, affd. reh'g., 723 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1983),
prob. juris. noted, 104 S.Ct. 2149b (1984); Stalland v. South Dakota Bd. of Bar Examiners,
530 F. Supp. 155, 158 (D.S.D. 1982); Strauss v. Alabama State Bar, 520 F. Supp. 173
(N.D.Ala. 1981); Sargus v. West Virginia Bd. of Law Examiners, 294 S.E.2d 440, 444
(W.Va. 1982); Sheley v. Alaska Bar Ass'n, 620 P.2d 640, 643 (Ala. 1980); In re Gordon v.
Commission on Character and Fitness, 48 N.Y.2d 266, 272, 397 N.E.2d 1309, 1312,422
N.Y.S.2d 641, 644-45 (1979); But see, Note, A Constitutional Analysis of State Bar Resi
dency Requirements Under the Interstate Privileges and Immunities Clause ofArticle IV, 92
HARv. L. REV. 1461, 1469 & n.45 (1979) (discussing dicta from late nineteenth century
cases that state that the practice of law is not a fundamental right).
20. See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978) (right to employment in the oil and
gas industry); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (right to fish); Ward v. Maryland, 79
U.S. (12 Wall) 418 (1870) (right to market produce). See Note, supra note 19, at 1468-70.
21. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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practice of a trade. 22 In Bates, the Court reasoned that the legal pro
fession, though a learned one, does not differ substantially from work
in which a crafts-person plies a trade. 23 Logically, therefore, the prac
tice of law acquires the status of a fundamental right. 24
Similarly, in Gordon v. Committee on Character & Fitness,25 the
Court of Appeals of New York declared:
[T]he right to pursue one's chosen occupation free from dis
criminatory interference is the very essence of the personal freedom
that the privileges and immunities clause was intended to se
cure. . . . It is now beyond dispute that the practice oflaw, despite
its historical antecedents as a learned profession somehow above
that of the common trades, is but a species of those commercial
activities within the ambit of the clause. . . . From the standpoint
of both the public and the legal profession itself, the practice of law
is analogous to any other occupation in which an independent agent
acts on behalf of a principal. 26

The court in In Re Jadd qualified its finding of a fundamental right,
however, by stating that challenges to the residency requirements for
admission to the bar have not focused on the question of the existence
of a fundamental right but rather on whether a sufficient state interest
exists. 27
There are various arguments on behalf of the state interest: the
residency requirement cultivates knowledge of state law; it allows the
community to observe moral character; it promotes community re
sponsibility; and it furthers administrative convenience in attorney-cli
ent communication, service of process, and administration of the bar
admission process. 28 Courts have found, nevertheless, that the articu
lated interests provide insufficient grounds for discrimination against
nonresidents seeking admission to the bar.29
22. Id. at 371-72.
23. See Bates, 433 U.S. at 371-72.
24. Id.
25. 48 N.Y.2d 266, 397 N.E.2d 1309,422 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1979).
26. Id. at 272, 397 N.E.2d at 1312,422 N.Y.S.2d at 644-45 (citations omitted).
27. In re Jadd, 391 Mass. at 231-32, 461 N.E.2d at 763 (1984). See Hicklin v.
Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978). The Court did not discuss whether a fundamental right had
been violated. Piper v. Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 539 F. Supp. 1064, 1071
(D.N.H. 1982), rev'd. 723 F.2d 98, withdrawn, a./f'd. on reh'g., 723 F.2d 110 (5th Cir. 1983),
prob. juris. noted, 104 S.Ct. 2149 (1984).
28. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. See also Special Project, Admission
to the Bar: A Constitutional Analysis, 34 VAND. L. REV. 665, 776-77 (1981).
29. See infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text. Special Project supra note 28, at
770. A substantial reason exists if "something to indicate that noncitizens constitute a
peculiar source of the evil . . ." can befound. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398 (1978).
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Residency, for example, does not necessarily promote knowledge
of locallaw. 30 Courts have also rejected the argument that the states
have a substantial interest in observing the ethical character of appli
cants since less restrictive alternatives exist such as the nationwide in
vestigatory service operated by the National Conference of Bar
Examiners,31 Additionally, courts have decided that administrative
convenience is an insufficient state interest.32 The court in In Re Jadd
considered each interest and found it to be insufficient. It therefore
struck its residency rule. 33
After concluding that the practice of law is a fundamental right
and that the state did not have sufficient interest to override the right,
the court turned to the final consideration of whether "the fact that an
attorney admitted on motion need not take and pass [the] state's bar
examination make[s] a difference in an analysis of the validity of a
residency requirement?"34 The court concluded that it does not make
a difference that nonresident applicants to the Massachusetts bar are
not required to take a test 35 since courts have determined that passing
a bar examination does not represent "an essential means in assessing
. . . knowledge of local law or any other qualification for admission to
the bar."36 In fact, not one recent court opinion that found a resi
dency requirement unconstitutional considered the distinction an im
portant factor in its analysis. 37

III.

CONCLUSION

Massachusetts by striking down its residency requirement for ad
mission to the bar on motion followed precedents set down by the
Supreme Court and other state courts. By focusing on the residency
requirement as a violation of the privileges and immunities clause, the
supreme judicial court followed the lead of other courts: thus, it
30. See Stalland v. South Dakota Bd. of Bar Examiners, 530 F. Supp. 155, 159-60
(S.D. 1982); Sargus v. West Virginia Bd. of Law Examiners, 294 S.E.2d 440, 445 (W. Va.
1982).
31. See Keenan v. Board of Law Examiners, 317 F. Supp. 1350, 1360 (E.D.N.C.
1970); Sargus v. West Virginia Bd. of Law Examiners, 294 S.E.2d 440,445-46. See Note,
supra note 19, at 1488.
32. See Stalland v. South Dakota Bd. of Bar Examiners, 530 F. Supp. 155, 160-61
(D.S.D. 1982); Noll v. Alaska Bar Ass'n, 649 P.2d 241, 245-46 (Alaska 1982); Sargus v.
West Virginia Bd. of Law Examiners, 294 S.E.2d 440, 445 (W. Va. 1982).
33. In re Jadd, 391 Mass. at 236, 237 n.13, 461 N.E.2d at 765, 766 n.13.
34. Id. at 236, 461 N.E.2d at 765. Cf supra note 3 and accompanying text.
35. Id. at 236-37, 461 N.E.2d at 765-66.
36. Id. at 236, 461 N.E.2d at 766. But cf supra note 3.
37. See Hafter, Toward the Multistate Practice of Law Through Admission by Reci
procity, 53 MISS. L.J. 1, 39 n.131 (1983).
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joined the many states that had already set aside their residency
requirements.
Many states still impose residency requirements on applicants to
their bars. As of March, 1983, twenty-eight states still required some
form of residency for admission on motion,38 and as of January, 1984,
twenty-nine states required residency of an original applicant to the
bar.39 In light of the statistics, litigation on the constitutionality of
residency requirements will continue.
The highest state courts that have addressed the issue have indi
cated their disfavor with the various forms of residency requirements.
By litigating the issue to the highest possible state courts, many in the
legal profession have also voiced their preference for striking down
residency requirements judicially. In Re Jadd is one such example.
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachussetts, following the major
ity, struck down its residency requirement. The trend gathers strength
in favor of the abolition of the rules because of their unconstitutional
ity. The time has arrived for the United States Supreme Court to de
cide the issue. 4O
Bruce CherifJ
38. Id. at 44-47. The following states require residency upon application: Arkansas,
Colorado, Delaware, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mis
souri, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Virginia and Wisconsin. States
that require residency from sixty days to six months before application are Connecticut,
Mississippi, Montana, North Carolina, Texas, and Vermont. Illinois, Ohio, and Oregon
require residency upon admission to the bar. New Mexico requires residence ninety days
before admission. Id.
39. See COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 2,3 (1984).
40. On October 31,1984, the United States Supreme Court heard oral arguments on
whether a state can prohibit non-residents from becoming members ofthe state bar. Davis,
N.H. Bases Residency Requirements Faces a Constitutional Challenge, NAT. L. J., Nov. 12,
1984, at 24, col. 3 (discussing Sup. Ct. of New Hampshire v. Piper, No. 83-1466). On
March 4, 1985, the Supreme Court decided Piper, Sup. Ct. of N.H. v. Piper, 53 U.S. Law
Week 4238 (March 5, 1985). The Court concluded that New Hampshire's bar residency
requirement violated the privileges and immunities clause of Art. IV, § 2, of the Constitu
tion. Id. at 4232. The Supreme Court first decided that the practice of law was a funda
mental right protected by the privileges and immunities clause. Id. at 4240. Cj supra note
15 & 18-19 and accompanying text. Because the practice of law is a fundamental right, the
Court stated that the state could discriminate against nonresidents only if it had "substan
tial" reasons for its disparate treatment of those nonresidents. Piper, 53 U.S. Law Week at
4242. Cj supra note 16 and accompanying text. Justice Powell writing for the majority
found that the Supreme Court of New Hampshire concerns, as to nonresident familiariza
tion with local rules and procedures, ethical behavior, availability for court proceedings,
and willingness to perform pro bono work, did not substantially "bear the necessary rela
tionship to the State's objectives" to justify discrimination against nonresidents. Piper, 53
U.S. Law Week at 4242. Cj supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text. Thus, the Supreme
Court concurred with the sound reasoning of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.

